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Abstract 
Recent financial scandals associated to accounting and other frauds allegedly blamed to top company managers (e.g. 
Enron, Worldcom, Paramalt, Satyam) have brought into public light the recurring question of whether companies are 
managed on the best interests of shareholders and other company stakeholders such as workers, creditors and the 
general community. The paper studies compliance of Corporate Governance requirements by Indian Companies. A 
model is developed to calculate the Corporate Governance Score of companies and then it is related to company 
attributes like size, profitability, leverage, foreign ownership etc. No significant correlation exists between Corporate 
Governance and company Characterists however average compliance by Indian Companies has been satisfactory. 
Factor analysis of major sub-parameters of Corporate Governance Score, namely Composition of Board, Audit 
Committee, Number of Board Meetings and Remuneration Committee is done. Two factors namely Strength of 
Committee and Competency level of Board are identified as important factors.  
Keywords: Corporate Governance Compliance, Disclosures & Transparency, Stakeholders, Factor Analysis 
 
1. Introduction 
Corporate governance has recently received much attention due to Adelphia, Enron, WorldCom, and other high 
profile scandals, serving as the impetus to such recent U.S. regulations as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 
considered to be the most sweeping corporate governance regulation in the past 70 years (Byrnes et al., 
2003).Corporate Governance is the overall control of activities in a corporation. It is concerned with the formulation 
of long-term objectives and plans and the proper management structure (organization, systems and people) to 
achieve them. At the same time, it entails making sure that the structure functions to maintain the corporation’s 
integrity and responsibility to its various constituents. The structure to ensure corporate governance includes the 
board of directors, top management, shareholders, creditors and others. Role of each of these stakeholders is crucial 
in guaranteeing responsible corporate performance. 
Corporate governance is the acceptance by management of the inalienable rights of shareholders as the true owners 
of the corporation and of their own role as trustees on behalf of the shareholders. It is about commitment to values, 
about ethical business conduct and about making a distinction between personal and corporate funds in the 
management of a company. The term governance has been derived from the word ‘gubernare’, which means “to rule 
or steer”. It originally meant to be a ‘normative’ framework for exercise of power and acceptance of accountability 
thereof in the running of kingdoms, regions and towns. However, over the years it has found significant relevance in 
the corporate world on account of growing number and size of corporations, the widening base of their shareholders, 
increasing linkages with the physical environment, and overall impact on the society’s well-being. Governance is the 
process whereby people in power make decisions that create, destroy or maintain social systems, structures and 
processes. Corporate Governance is therefore the process whereby people in power direct, monitor and lead 
corporations, and thereby either create, modify or destroy the structures and systems under which they operate.  
According to James D. Wolfensohn, President of World Bank, “Corporate Governance is about promoting corporate 
fairness, transparency and accountability.” Corporate Governance is more a way of business life than a mere legal 
compulsion. There is nothing laudable about complying with conditions/practices, which the companies are forced to 
adopt through the process of legal prescription. Of course, companies must focus on their core objective of earning 
profits, but the earning and sharing of profits needs to be aligned with the expectations of stakeholders. The investors 
tend to value and remain loyal to organisations having established credentials for making efforts aimed at benefiting 
various categories of stakeholders. Adoption of distinct corporate governance practices distinguishes a company 
from ordinary companies, which are content merely with complying with prescribed legal requirements. The 
companies adopting distinct corporate governance practices stand out from others.  
Ancient Indian literature has laid down principals for corporate governance. The lessons from Kautilya's 
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Arthashastra (4th Century BC) can be integrated into the modern context of corporate management towards 
achieving the ultimate aim of corporate governance, which is to provide value to shareholders and stakeholders. 
Public interest in corporate governance is nothing new. It dates back to 1970 when in the wake of the establishment, 
maintenance and review of internal control was passed in the trade way in the Trade- way commission was formed 
following the saving and loan crisis. In 1990 the Cadbury committee code of best practices in the U.K., the combined 
code of London Stock Exchange, the Blue ribbon committee of U.S., the OECD Code of 1998 and the joint efforts of 
World Bank and the OECD to develop benchmarks in corporate governance have kept public interest kindling.  
2. Evolution of Corporate Governance Code in India 
Ancient Indian literature has laid down principals for corporate governance. While it is beyond the scope of this 
paper to describe the recommendations by the committee’s in detail, an effort is made to summaries the gist of 
various committees and the subsequent evolution of Corporate Governance Code in India. 
CII Code on Corporate Governance (1998): In 1996, CII took a special initiative on Corporate Governance – the 
first institutional initiative in Indian industry, to develop and promote a code for Corporate Governance. This 
initiative by CII flowed from public concerns regarding the protection of investor interest, especially the small 
investor; the promotion of transparency within business and industry; the need to move towards international 
standards in terms of disclosure of information by the corporate sector and, through all of this, to develop a high 
level of public confidence in business and industry. A National Task Force set up with Mr. Rahul Bajaj, as the 
Chairman presented the draft guidelines and the code of Corporate Governance in April 1997.  
Birla Committee on Corporate Governance (1999): The Committee was set up by SEBI to promote and raise the 
standards of Corporate Governance. The Committee’s terms of reference included suggesting suitable amendments 
to the listing agreement executed by the stock exchanges with the companies in order to enhance corporate 
governance standards of listed companies, drafting a code of corporate best practices; and suggest safeguards to be 
instituted within the companies to deal with insider information and insider trading. Several of the Committee’s 
recommendations were incorporated in Clause 49 of the listing agreement of stock exchanges. 
Naresh Chandra Committee Report on Corporate Audit and Governance (2002): Following the corporate 
scandals of the US, the Department of Corporate Affairs (DCA), Government of India set up the Naresh Chandra 
Committee to examine various corporate governance issues. Many recommendations of the report were incorporated 
in the Companies (Amendment) Bill 2003.  
Narayana Murthy Committee Report on the Corporate Governance (2003): The Committee was constituted by 
SEBI to review the performance of corporate governance in the country as well as to determine the role of companies 
in responding to rumour and other price sensitive information circulating in the market in order to enhance the 
transparency and integrity of the market. 
Dr. J.J.Irani Report on New Company’s Act (2004/05): The recommendations of this committee were primarily 
on revision of existing Companies Act, 1956 so as to bring about compactness by reducing the size of the Act and 
removing redundant provisions and facilitate easy and unambiguous interpretation by recasting the provisions of the 
law. This enabled provision of greater flexibility in rule making, to enable timely response to ever-evolving business 
models and protecting the interests of the shareholders and investors. 
3. Review of Literature 
Gupta, Nair and Gogula (2003) analyzed the CG reporting practices of 30 selected Indian companies listed in BSE. 
The CG section of the annual reports for the years 2001-02 and 2002-03 had been analyzed by using the content 
analysis, and least square regression technique was used for data analysis. The study found variations in the reporting 
practices of the companies, and in certain cases, omission of mandatory requirements as per Clause 49. 
 
Bhattacharyya and Rao (2005) examined whether adoption of Clause 49 predicts lower volatility and returns for 
large Indian firms, they compare a one-year period after adoption (starting June 1, 2001) to a similar period before 
adoption (starting June 1, 1998). The logic is that Clause 49 should improve disclosure and thus reduce information 
asymmetry and thereby reduce share price volatility. The authors find insignificant results for volatility and mixed 
results for returns. 
Collett and Hrasky (2005) analyzed the relationships between voluntary disclosure of CG information by the 
companies and their intention to raise capital in the financial market. A sample of 299 companies listed on Australian 
stock exchange had been taken for the year 1994 and Connect-four database had been used for collection of annual 
reports of companies. The study found out that “only 29 Australian companies made voluntary CG disclosure, and 
the degree of disclosures were varied from company to company.” 
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Barako et al., (2006) examined the extent of voluntary disclosure by the Kenyan companies over and above the 
mandatory requirements. This study covered a period of 10 years from 1992 to 2001. The results revealed that “the 
audit committee was a significant factor associated with level of voluntary disclosure, while the proportion of non-
executive directors on the board was negatively associated.” Subramanian (2006), he identified the differences in 
disclosure pattern of financial information and governance attributes. A sample of 90 companies from BSE 100 
index, NSE Nifty had been taken. The data with respect to disclosure score had been collected from the annual 
reports of the companies for the financial year 2003-04. The study used the Standard & Poor’s “Transparency and 
Disclosure Survey Questionnaire” for collection of data. The study finally concluded that “there were no differences 
in disclosure pattern of public/private sector companies, as far as financial transparency and information disclosure 
were concerned.”  
K. C. Gupta (2006) traced out the differences in CG practices of few local companies of an automobile industry. The 
data with respect to governance practices had been collected from the annual report of the companies for the year 
2004-05. The study “did not observe significant deviations of actual governance practices from Clause 49.” 
Subramanian (2006) identified the differences in disclosure pattern of financial information and governance 
attributes, namely board and management structure, process and ownership structure, and investors relations of 
Indian companies. A sample of 90 companies from BSE 100 index, NSE Nifty and Nifty Junior had been taken. It is 
classified into public sector and private sector including the subsidiaries of multinational companies. The data with 
respect to disclosure score had been collected from the annual reports of the companies for the financial year 2003-
04. The researcher had used the Standard & Poor's `Transparency and Disclosure Survey Questionnaire' for 
collection of data. This questionnaire was based on 98 items, divided into three categories such as financial 
disclosure, board and management structure disclosure, and ownership structure and investors relations related 
disclosure. Disclosure score on board attributes, financial information and ownership structure had been taken as 
dependent variable. On the other hand, management control in the form of government control, private promoter 
control and MNCs control had been taken as independent variables. Foreign institutional investors' holdings, sales 
and listing status were used as control variables in this study. Multivariate regression technique was used for the 
analysis. The researcher observed that there were no differences in disclosure pattern of public sector and private 
sector companies as far as financial transparency and information disclosure were concerned. It had also been 
observed that private companies disclose more information under the category of board and management structure. 
The researcher had also pointed out that his study did not differentiate between mandatory and voluntary items of 
disclosure index.  
 
4. Objective of the Study 
• To examine the level of compliance with disclosure requirements of the Corporate Governance Code by 
Indian companies  
• To determine whether any relationship exists between the compliance with Corporate Governance Code and 
a number of key company characteristics like Market Capitalization, Net Profit Margin, Leverage Ratio, FII 
Stake and Promoter Stake. 
• To conduct Factor analysis for important sub-parameters of Corporate Governance Compliance score. 
5. Data and Methodology 
5.1 Data 
A sample of 30 companies was selected from the companies listed on the BSE. All the selected companies are “A” 
group companies. Annual reports of the selected companies were the major sources of data. Corporate Governance 
Score (CG Score) is taken as Dependent variables and several Company attributes are considered as Explanatory 
Variables. 
5.2 Calculation of Corporate Governance Score 
In this study the Corporate Governance Score (CG Score) is calculated for each Company under consideration based 
on the extent of compliance of the Company to the various parameters of Corporate Governance and the weightage 
allotted to that parameter. Clause 49 is considered as a basic framework here for calculating the CG Score across the 
different parameters. Calculation of Corporate Governance Score is explained in Table 1. 
5.3 Explanatory Variables and Hypotheses  
Researchers have addressed the impact of various corporate characteristics on the disclosures in annual report. These 
characteristics include size, profitability, listing status, size of equity market, leverage, etc. The procedure for 
operationalzing the variables in the regression analysis and the rationale for expecting them to explain disclosure 
variability are outlined in Table 2. 
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Following Hypothesis was framed using the above variables. 
Null Hypothesis (H0) There is no relationship between Company Attributes and CG Score. 
Size  
Theoretically, size of a firm is assumed to affect the level of disclosure in the annual reports. Larger the firm, the 
more is the information disclosed in the annual reports. Many reasons have been advocated in the literature to 
support this relationship. For example, generating and disseminating information are costly exercises. Only large 
firms would be having necessary resources and expertise for the production and publication of more sophisticated 
financial statements with maximum disclosures required by the users. 
H1: Larger Companies have higher CG score. 
Profitability   
Corporate profitability affects the disclosure in annual reports in many ways. Moreover, agency theory suggests that 
managers of very profitable firms will use external information to their personal advantage. So they will disclose 
detailed information in order to support the continuance of their positions and compensation agreements. 
H2: Companies with larger profits have higher CG score. 
Leverage 
A positive relationship can be expected between leverage and disclosure level. Companies having higher levels of 
debts are seen to be more risky and incur more monitoring costs. The disclosure of information reduces the 
monitoring costs and facilitates the creditors in assessing the firms risk and cost of debt. 
H3: Companies with higher Leverage have a higher CG score. 
FII stake 
Ownership of FII seems to be making company more responsible in their behaviour to comply with the disclosure 
requirements. 
H4: Companies with higher FII Ownership have CG score. 
 
5.4 Formulation of Model 
In order to determine the effect of company characteristics on compliance with CG score Multiple Regression 
technique is used. 
Considering calculated CG Score as dependent variable and other company attributes as explanatory variables 
following equation can be framed.  
CG Score = α +β1MCAP +β2 NPR+β3 DE+ β4 FIIOWN  
 
6. Results and Discussions 
6.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3 shows that Average CG Score is 76.63%, whereas maximum and minimum is 94% and 58% respectively. 
6.2 Correlation matrix 
The correlation is calculated between the Corporate Score and the other financial parameters. At 5% Level of 
Significance there is no correlation between Corporate Score and the financial parameters which are considered. 
However at the given level of significance we find correlation between Net Profit Margin and Normalized Market 
Capitalization (Table 4). 
6.3 Regression results 
Multi-linear Regression of Corporate Score against NPM, FII Stake, Normalized Market Capitalization and Leverage 
Ratio is performed. The analysis (Table 5) shows that no variables are significant at 5% level of significance. Hence 
we cannot reject null Hypothesis. However the level of significance value for Leverage ratio is 8.5%, thus at 10% 
level of significance we would be able to reject the null hypothesis of no relation between Leverage Ratio and 
Corporate Score. 
6.4 Factor Analysis  
Factor analysis of four sub parameters of Corporate Governance Score, namely Composition of Board, Audit 
Committee, Number of Board Meetings and Remuneration Committee is done. From the factor analysis (Table 6) 
two factors are derived which explain 66% of the variance between the four parameters of Corporate Governance. 
The first factor which alone explains 35% of the variance is substantially extracted from Audit Committee and 
Remuneration Committee. Thus the first factor hints at the strength of the Committees in a given Company. The 
second factor which explains 31% of the variance is substantially extracted from Composition of Board and Number 
of Board Meetings. The second factor hints at the competency level of the Board. Lower the competency level higher 
the number of times the Board meets. Thus two factors namely ‘Strength of Committee’ and ‘Competency level of 
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Board’ are derived from this Factor Analysis. 
7. Conclusions 
The paper concludes that financial parameters like Net Profit Margin, Market Capitalization, FII Stake and Leverage 
Ratio resulted in co-efficient values which were found to be not significantly related to Corporate Governance score. 
From the empirical data and analysis done it may be concluded that in India the state of Corporate Governance may 
not be an important factor for FFIs to decide on buying stakes in the company. Also the myth that generally 
Companies with Small and Medium Market Capitalization do not have a very strong and sound Corporate 
Governance was proved false by the regression analysis as there was no significant relationship found between 
coefficient of Normalized Market Capitalization and Corporate Governance Score of the Companies. The significant 
coefficient of Leverage Ratio to Corporate Governance hints possibility of two cases, one being that unlike Fund 
Managers of FIIs, Creditors are very conservative in their approach and do a thorough check of the Corporate 
Governance state of a Company before lending debts or it may also be so that Companies would have to prove a 
robust and sound Corporate Governance so as to raise debt from the market. Factor Analysis revealed that ‘Strength 
of Committee’ and ‘Competency level of Board’ are two important sub parameters. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 1: Computation of Corporate Governance Score 
Sr.No Parameter Break-up Weightage 
1. Corporate Governance Philosophy - 2 
2. Composition of Board of Directors - 20 
2a. - Proportion of Non Executive directors to total number 
of directors 
4  
2b. - Proportion of Independent directors to total number of 
directors 
4  
2c. - Average Directorship per member of the board 4  
2d. - Average Committee Chairmanship per member of the 
board 
4  
2e. - Average Committee Membership per member of the 
board 
4  
3. Number of Board Meetings in a year - 5 
4. Code of conduct - 3 
5. Audit Committee  15 
5a. - Number of Non executive Directors in the Committee 2  
5b. - Number of Independent Directors in the Committee 4  
5c. - Audit Committee chaired by Independent Director 2  
5d. - Presence of the Chairman of the Audit Committee in 
the last AGM 
2  
5e. - Number of Audit Committee Meetings 3  
5f. - Quorum at the Audit Committee Meeting 2  
6. Shareholder’s Grievance Committee - 5 
7.  Whistle Blower Policy - 4 
8. Disclosure - 15 
8a. - Contingent Liabilities 3  
8b. - Related Party Transactions 3  
8c. - Remuneration to Directors 3  
8d. - Non compliance, Penalty or Stricture 3  
8e. - Accounting treatment  3  
9. Management Discussion and Analysis Report - 5 
10. CEO/CFO Certification - 5 
11. Compliance Report on Corporate Governance - 5 
12. Remuneration Committee - 10 
12a. - Number of Non Executive Directors in the Committee 3  
12b. - Committee chaired by the Independent Director 3  
12c. - Presence of the Chairman of Remuneration Committee 
in the last AGM 
2  
12d. - Quorum at the Remuneration Committee Meeting 2  
13. Training of the Non Executive Directors - 3 
14.  Postal Ballot - 3 
  Total 100 
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Table 2: List of Variables and Method of Calculation  
Variables Represented by Calculation 
Size Market Capitalization 
(Normalised) 
Market Capitalization (Normalised)= Market 
Capitalization/(max(Market Capitalization)-                                                                          
min (Market Capitalization)) 
Profitability   
 
Net Profit Margin Net Profit Margin= Profit After Tax/Sales 
Turnover 
Leverage D/E Ratio Debt/Equity 
FII stake % of FII Ownership  
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
 
  CG Score FII Stake Leverage NPM 
Mark Cap 
(Normalized) 
Mean 76.63 0.0915 0.7404 0.1032 0.1565 
Median 76 0.06 0.577 0.1027 0.0376 
Mode 72 0 0 0.0855 0.0012 
Standard Deviation 8.4661 0.0877 0.7355 0.1399 0.2603 
Range 36 0.3022 3.4999 0.9245 1 
Minimum 58 0 0 -0.3772 0.0004 
Maximum 94 0.3022 3.4999 0.5473 1.0004 
 
Table 4: Correlation Matrix 
Table 5: Regression Results 
  Corporate_
Score FII_Stake 
Leverage
_Ratio NPM 
Market_Cap 
(Normalised) 
Corporate_Score Pearson Correlation 1 .002 -.282 .078 -.044 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .989 .112 .666 .806 
N 33 33 33 33 33 
FII_Stake Pearson Correlation .002 1 -.051 .152 .075 
Sig. (2-tailed) .989  .778 .399 .679 
N 33 33 33 33 33 
Leverage_Ratio Pearson Correlation -.282 -.051 1 -.098 -.320 
Sig. (2-tailed) .112 .778  .587 .070 
N 33 33 33 33 33 
NPM Pearson Correlation .078 .152 -.098 1 .409
*
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .666 .399 .587  .018 
N 33 33 33 33 33 
Nor_Market_Cap Pearson Correlation -.044 .075 -.320 .409
*
 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .806 .679 .070 .018  
N 33 33 33 33 33 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).     
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        Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound Upper Bound 
  
(Constant) 79.883 3.062 
  
26.089 0 73.611 86.155 
FII_Stake -1.863 17.363 -0.019 -0.107 0.915 -37.428 33.703 
Leverage_Ratio 
-3.86 2.164 -0.335 -1.784 0.085 -8.292 0.573 
NPM 7.947 11.909 0.131 0.667 0.51 -16.448 32.342 
Market_Cap 
(Normalised) -6.632 6.663 -0.204 -0.995 0.328 -20.28 7.017 
Dependent Variable: Corporate_Score 
Table 6: Factor Analysis Output 
Component Matrix
a
 
 Component 
 1 2 
Composition_of_Board .480 -.642 
Board_Meeting .021 .855 
Audit_Committee .789 .282 
Remuneration_Committee .753 .091 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
  
 
Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigen values Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 1.422 35.538 35.538 1.422 35.538 35.538 
2 1.231 30.765 66.303 1.231 30.765 66.303 
3 .775 19.368 85.671    
4 .573 14.329 100.000    
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.    
